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The main point of this paper is to discuss some of the ways politicians try to 
survive in office and to increase their margin of manoeuvre to design and 
implement policies. I will assume that, in addition to policy preferences, 
politicians want to win elections, stay in power, and maximize their autonomy 
in case their policies diverge from voters’ preferences. I will also assume that 
manipulative strategies consist of attempts by politicians to avoid the cost of 
such divergence1. The following discussion will try to link agency theory and 
Machiavellian politics in order to interpret some aspects of the control of 
politicians by citizens in democracy. It will also draw from evidence pertain­
ing to recent Spanish politics in order to provide illustrations of typical politi­
cal strategies and their consequences. It will examine some conjunctures of the 
Socialist government from 1982 to 1996: a long period in office, most of it 
with an absolute majority in Parliament, marked by four consecutive electoral 
victories as well as by the troubled waters of unpopular economic policies, 
high unemployment, a dramatic reversal of position over NATO, and a long 
string of financial scandals.
Democratic theory has traditionally considered that, although the interests 
of citizens and politicians may diverge, elections are the instrument whereby 
citizens can ensure that politicians will act on their behalf and carry out their 
policy preferences. As a consequence, as Dahl put it, “a key characteristic of a 
democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the government to the prefer­
ences of its citizens” (Dahl, 1970: 1). At election time, voters will listen to 
promises from competing politicians, look for clues about their trustworthi­
ness, compare, and choose accordingly. The choice would be both meaningful 
and consequential. Elections would thus act as a prospective mechanism for the 
responsiveness of politicians -under perfect information, rebus sic stantibus, 
politicians will adhere to the mandate. And elections would also protect citi-
1 The concept of manipulation that I use in the discussion differs from that of Riker in that 
voters’ preferences are not considered as given, strategies largely deal with information, 
and the main political initiatives do not correspond to the former losers but to incumbents 




























































































zens’ interests as a retrospective mechanism: voters will examine past perfor­
mance, and as a result reward or punish politicians. Thus, because in democ­
racies politicians suffer the consequences of their policies and unpopular poli­
cies make them lose elections, governments will respond in anticipation to the 
interests and preferences of citizens.
We can examine this relationship between politicians and citizens within the 
framework of agency theory. An agency relationship arises in those situations 
in which one actor, the agent, acts on behalf of another, the principal, and is 
supposed to implement the preferences and interests of the latter. The voters, 
as principal, will select an agent out of several competitors in an election, 
invest him with power, and expect him to respond to their policy preferences: 
that is, to adhere to electoral programs and political promises on whose 
grounds the selection of the agent was made. The agent will be politically 
accountable when the principal can hold him responsible for past performance 
and, therefore, reward him with reelection or punish him with defeat. A per­
fect agency relationship would reflect a view of political representation 
according to which “the rulers should be identified with the people; their 
interest and will should be the interest and will of the nation (...) let the rulers 
be effectively responsible to it, promptly removed by it, and it could afford to 
trust them with power of which it could itself dictate the use to be made” 
(Stuart Mill, 1991: 24).
But are politicians controlled by citizens through elections as traditional 
democratic theory and perfect agency assume? There is substantial compara­
tive empirical evidence that elections do indeed influence policy prospectively, 
and that policies can be predicted out of the “issue agendas” that emerge from 
interparty competition (Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge, 1994). Politicians 
concerned about reelection listen to public opinion when they take policy ini­
tiatives. As Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson vividly put it, “politicians are 
keen to pick up the faintest signals in their political environment. Like ante­
lope in an open field, they cock their ears and focus their full attention on the 
slightest sign of danger” (Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson, 1995: 559). The 
evidence has shown that public opinion drives policy; that, either through 
electoral replacement of the incumbents or rational anticipation of the latter to 
policy moods of the citizens that might change over time, governments reflect 
in their policy initiatives the preferences of voters; that party election pro­
grams make it possible to predict the course of action of the winners; and that 




























































































So democratic governments appear to be responsive, and the cause to lie in 
elections and the anticipation of elections. Yet this view of democratic respon­
siveness faces several problems. For one, it takes voters’ policy preferences as 
exogenous. For two, although considerable empirical evidence shows that 
prospective evaluations influence the vote (Lewis-Beck, 1988), no institutions 
other than elections exist to force incumbents to implement subsequently their 
original promises. For three, citizens may be myopic in their preferences: 
should responsive incumbents care about such policy preferences or about 
their consequences? Politicians might think that if their policies adhere to the 
ex ante configuration of preferences that are temporally inconsistent, they may 
pay the costs later on, when the long term negative consequences emerge. 
Thus, politicians will want to influence public opinion, not just respond to it. 
Can they do so? Considerable evidence exists on the relative malleability of 
such opinion (Page and Shapiro, 1983 and 1992; Shapiro and Jacobs, 1989): 
politicians can manipulate citizens’ preferences and obtain a margin of auton­
omy for their policies. Jacobs and Shapiro have termed this influence, rather 
benevolently, as “the leadership effect” (Jacobs and Shapiro, 1994: 9-16). 
Manipulation of public opinion is usually intended to have effects on retro­
spective accountability at election time; sometimes, however, politicians try to 
influence opinion prospectively, so that they obtain from citizens a mandate to 
do what the politicians want. The latter may be attempted through referenda: 
although their results are usually not imperative, they may provide useful 
backing for politicians who have to take difficult decisions- they might also 
occasionally provide them with serious frights (as in the cases of the Spanish 
referendum on NATO in 1986, or the French and Danish referenda on 
Maastricht in 1992 and 1993).
Democratic governments are accountable when citizens can judge their 
record retrospectively at election time, and punish or reward them accord­
ingly. Politicians anticipate such judgement when they undertake policy initia­
tives and pay attention to the interests of the voters. So, rather than look at 
promises, citizens evaluate past performance. And on the basis of such assess­
ment, in Key’s succinct dictum, “the vocabulary of the voice of the people 
consists mainly of the words ‘yes’ and ‘no’” (Key, 1964: 544). A vast evidence 
indicates, for example, that the performance of the economy has a great influ­
ence on the support to incumbents at election time: when economic conditions 
are bad, citizens vote against the ruling party (Fiorina, 1981; Lewis-Beck, 
1988; Norpoth, Lewis-Beck, and Lafay, 1991). Yet Cheibub and Przeworski 
also provide exhaustive empirical findings, covering the period from 1950 to 




























































































heads of democratic governments is not sensitive to this performance (Cheibub 
and Przeworski, 1996). Elections appear to be blind mechanisms that displace 
rulers at random. If it is the case that the life and death of governments are 
independent from the evolution of the economies, then the mechanisms of 
democratic accountability must be critically examined. And we all know that 
politicians often opt for unpopular policies, that these can be ineffective, that 
political promises can be broken2. That is, policies frequently appear to be 
unresponsive to the preferences and the interests of citizens, and they are also 
poorly evaluated retrospectively. Yet it is not exceptional that politicians man­
age to survive. How do the mechanisms of accountability operate? When gov­
ernments lose, is it because their policies are unpopular? And, on the contrary, 
when they survive, is it because their policies are popular? What is it that they 
do to remain in power? How do they try to manipulate accountability?
Machiavellian politics assumed that strategies could determine the survival 
of politicians, accommodating the governed to unpopular initiatives or to 
breaches of promises: “a prudent Prince neither can nor ought to keep his 
word when to keep it is hurtful to him and the causes which led him to pledge 
it are removed... No Prince was ever at a loss for plausible reasons to cloak a 
breach of faith... It is necessary, indeed, to put a good colour on this matter, 
and to be skilful in simulating and dissembling. But men are so simple, and 
governed so absolutely by their present needs, that he who wishes to deceive 
will never fail in finding willing dupes... He must therefore keep his mind 
ready to shift as the winds and tides of Fortune turn” (Machiavelli, 1992: 46). 
How can this be done under the conditions of modern democracy, where mod­
ern Princes are in a less favorable position than in early 16th century 
Florence?
To examine the context of such strategies, agency theory provides useful 
clues. An agency relationship will face problems of accountability when the 
interests of principal and agent do not coincide, the former cannot easily 
determine whether it is in his interest that the policies of the latter are being 
taken, and his capacity to reward good agents and sanction opportunist and 
self-interested ones is limited. Thus democratic accountability might entail a 
“moral hazard” problem: whenever the principal’s (i.e. the citizens’) informa-
2 Promises may be different in their nature and strength, and this will influence the possi­
bility of assessing their implementation. Promises may refer to policy proposals, but also 
to general goals and values, or to procedures of decision-making. And candidates may 
give them high salience in their programs, or on the contrary state them in conditional 




























































































tion is unverifiable, the possibility will arise of politicians that, once elected, 
will not advance the preferences and interests of citizens, and whose survival is 
unrelated to their performance. The principal may commit two errors: to 
reward an agent who has shirked or to punish an agent who has worked in the 
principal’s interest. Indeed, the control of agent by principal depends on three 
requirements: that the actions of the agent and the conditions under which it 
operates can be publicly known; that both parties are symmetrically able to 
anticipate fully all possible contingencies that might arise during their relation­
ship; that the agent can be bound costlessly by the principal to carry out the 
preferences and interests of the latter (Sappington, 1991). Therefore, the con­
trol of politicians by voters faces problems of information, monitoring, and 
commitment.
Problems of information and monitoring arise when politicians manipulate 
information to which they have privileged access, and when vast areas of poli­
tics are opaque to voters. These might have difficulty in assessing whether 
good or bad outcomes are due to governmental policies or to “objective con­
ditions” whose responsibility cannot be attributed to the government. Also new 
contingencies, which can never be fully anticipated, will arise once the elected 
politician is in office. These may make citizens uncertain about whether their 
initial preferences respond now to their real or long term interests. Such new 
contingencies partly explain why democratic mandates are never imperative, 
and why they resemble “relational contracts” -i.e. agreements that frame the 
agency relationship when complete and enforceable contracts that specify the 
behavior to be adopted are impossible. In such contracts, “the parties do not 
agree on detailed plans of action but on goals and objectives, on general pro­
visions that are broadly applicable, on the criteria to be used in deciding what 
to do when unforeseen contingencies arise, on who has what power to act and 
the bounds limiting the range of actions that can be taken” (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992: 131). But voters might have difficulties in discerning whether 
the “objective conditions” are indeed different to those anticipated before the 
politician came to office, whether they are really beyond the control of the 
agent, and whether they are being manipulated.
That is, citizens will have limited information on their interests and on 
whether they are being taken care of by a perfect agent. Did politicians deviate 
from promises out of concern for the welfare of citizens -  “the general inter­
est”? Did they campaign on the contrary on popular policies that they knew 
were ineffective, only to renege from them once in office in order to adopt 




























































































them out of office in order to enforce the predictability of policies out of 
future campaign promises? Or should they reward them with re-election 
because they cared about the “objective interests” of citizens more than about 
their ex ante preferences?
The commitment problem arises when agents, or politicians, may not bear 
the full impact of their actions. A basic condition for “no cheating” to be an 
equilibrium is that the present value of the future gains from not cheating 
outweighs the temptation to cheat. This depends on several requisites3, but 
crucially on the capacity of the principal, or citizens, to prevent or ensure such 
“future gains”, that is, to sanction or reward their agent. The problem emerges 
when carrying out the punishment is costly to the citizens. This is not unusual 
in democratic politics, where elections are about policy package deals and 
relative choices. And where the vote is a particularly crude sanctioning 
instrument: in the words of O’Flaherty, “politics can be nothing more than 
meeting out rewards and punishments, and doing so in a ham-fisted manner” 
(O’Flaherty, 1990: 134). Governmental action is multidimensional, and voters 
may want to reject some policies but retain others that they value. Incumbents 
will fully play a balancing game, making popular and unpopular policies 
interdependent. And citizens may dislike the opposition even more intensely. 
As Jensen and Meckling put it examining agency relationships in firms, “the 
size of the divergence (the agency costs) will be directly related to the cost of 
replacing the manager” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Elections are not just 
about sanctioning an agent who has performed poorly, but about whether to 
appoint an alternative one. Thus governments will play a comparative game: 
the discredit of the opposition is probably a more usual electoral resource than 
explanations of past actions or promises about the future. So, although in 
Ferejohn’s model the importance of challengers lies entirely on their avail­
ability and it is the existence of willing alternative officeseekers that gives the 
voter whatever leverage he has on the incumbent (Ferejohn, 1986), it is also 
the case that the latter may use to his advantage citizens’ mistrust towards the 
opposition.
If democratic accountability depends on whether voters have information to 
assess performance, responsibility can be assigned, and incumbents can be 
punished or rewarded, then the strategies of politicians who want to remain in
3 These conditions include the reputation of the agent (its political capital value), the value 
if attaches to holding office in the future (the premium earned for what it supplies), and a 
discount rate low enough so that future gains are greater than the temptation to cheat. See 




























































































office and benefit from a wide margin of manoeuvre will be manipulative 
regarding one or more of these requisites. But they will have to do so in a 
restrictive scenario. Obviously the incumbents will face the strategies of the 
opposition politicians, who want to replace them and who will manipulate the 
information in the opposite direction: they will, for example, attribute the 
responsibility for good news to exogenous factors and for bad news to the 
government. And more generally, incumbents will deploy their strategies in a 
scenario occupied by a plethora of actors with criss-crossing interests that will 
be providing citizens with very heterogeneous information relevant for the 
accountability of the government. This information will be related to policies 
or policy outcomes; but it may also deal with activities of politicians previous 
to holding office, their private lives, and different strategies of discredit. 
Critical information of this kind may both paralyse the agendas of the incum­
bents and raise new dimensions of political liability. True or false, it clearly 
has a major impact among citizens: according to a recent Spanish survey4, 
when asked about the main qualities to be demanded from a politician, 56% of 
people chose “to be honest” as the first one, 17% as the second; “to keep 
promises” was selected by 12% as their first choice, and by 25% as their sec­
ond one (“to be able to take decisions, even if they are unpopular” only came 
first in 5% of the cases, and second in 10%). It may indeed be the case that 
politicians lose office more easily due to private scandals than to failed poli­
cies. So, the flow of information on the performance of the agent and the 
instruments for monitoring him have a particular complexity in politics.
This political scenario in which the mechanisms of accountability operate 
has changed very much in recent times. The media often take up the role of 
the opposition in Parliament: that is, the opposition follows, rather than leads, 
the media. The parliamentary political agenda is generally set by the informa­
tion flow of newspapers, radios, television programmes. In fact, parliamentary 
debates have a comparatively limited impact, except on rare occasions. Thus, a 
motion of no-confidence may be presented not just when it might be viable in 
parliamentary terms, but also when the challenger who is likely to loose hopes 
nevertheless to raise his political stature through the media. And politicians 
cultivate more the media than Parliament in the explanation and defence of 
their policies. Bruno Kreisky, the Austrian prime minister, estimated that 80% 
of his schedule was dedicated to relations with the media5. The judiciary has 
also acquired a major role in the mechanisms of political accountability and in 
the definition of the political agenda. That is, politics has become more judi-
4 Survey of the Centro de Investigaciones Sociol6gicas, April 1995.




























































































cialized and justice more politicized. Politicians often react to this political 
influence of media and judiciary contrasting their own democratic support to 
the non-elected nature of these powerful actors. They would like them to 
reflect the political majority of the day: for instance, attributing to Parliament 
the nominations to the judiciary, or introducing participatory democracy 
within the media (as Andreas Papandreou, the Greek prime minister, 
attempted to do through legislation). Such reactions are implicitly or explicitly 
supported by an argument which opposes democracy to pluralism. Of course, 
the argument would be more credible if the institutions of democracy per­
formed satisfactorily as instruments of accountability, providing information 
on incumbents and facilitating their monitoring; on the contrary, it would 
appear to be cynical if democratic accountability were to be critically depen­
dent on the institutions of pluralism.
Yet the control over politicians can hardly be ensured by pluralist institu­
tions when democratic institutions (such as Parliament or parties) are impotent 
instruments of accountability. Such control requires independent media, real 
pluralism of information, and fairness of coverage. And centres of vast eco­
nomic and informative resources have interests of their own, which do not 
overlap with those of citizens, that guide their strategies towards the govern­
ment of the day. They may use pressure, threats, blackmail, or sheer destabi­
lization: to paraphrase Harry Truman, they can considerably raise the heat 
inside the kitchen. Such strategies will manipulate citizens; the latter will dis­
pose of information that will facilitate their monitoring of incumbents, but 
they will also be misled with disinformation6. And, although citizens will sus­
pect or be aware of the latter, they will also grant credit to the former, for 
shedding light over issues that democratic institutions had not revealed. So, 
when politicians complain for the treatment they get from the pluralist institu­
tions, their best strategy is to facilitate monitoring through Parliament and 
parties.
6 When citizens suffer informative manipulation from multiple sources, a limited interest in 
politics on their part may paradoxically facilitate the control over politicians. As Ferejohn 
puts it, “because citizens care so little about politics, political evaluations and attachments 
are relatively stable and slow to shift. Thus, competitors for office are induced to regard 
them as external ‘facts’ about their environment and not really subject to intentional ma­
nipulation. In a sense, citizens are able to act ‘as i f  they have precommitted to a reward 
scheme. Thus, the fact that citizens do not pay much attention to new information and that 
politicians know this, implies that politicians are limited in their ability to take advantage 





























































































In this complex scenario of political accountability, incumbents will be 
backed by their own party, often held together by powerful instruments of 
discipline. They will face an opposition in Parliament supposed to play a cru­
cial role in providing information on incumbents and monitoring them. Media 
and judiciary will be influencing the definition of agendas and shedding light 
(or shadows) on politicians. And centres of economic and informational power 
will pursue their own interests, developing strategies that will both help and 
distort the monitoring of incumbents. In this scenario, facing demands for 
political responsiveness and anticipating accountability, what will modem 
Princes do? Remember that we assume that they are interested in their own 
political survival, independently from the median voter’s position. That is, 
they want to remain in power and to maximize their margin of manoeuvre for 
unpopular policies or breaches of promises. To achieve these goals, politicians 
will develop strategies directed towards their own party and towards public 
opinion -or citizens. And they will try to rally them against the opposition, the 
hostile press, the conspiring centres of power, and the inquisitive judges, 
whose credibility they will try to undermine.
The role of parties in the mechanisms of political accountability has not 
been sufficiently studied. Politicians have often been treated in two contradic­
tory ways: either as simple reflections of parties considered as unitary actors ( 
mostly when examining Western European politics), or as autonomous from 
parties viewed as irrelevant ( generally when analyzing Latin American poli­
tics). Many effects of different party systems remain unclear. Take, for 
instance, the rather trivial argument that in systems of proportional represen­
tation, with multiple and centralized parties, governments are closer to the 
median voter and more representative of the issue preferences of the electorate 
(Huber and Powell, 1994; Dalton, 1988): this says little about their account­
ability or electoral vulnerability. Think of the Italian case, where the median 
voter was fed up with the unaccountable median politician. Also, while coali­
tion governments are considered to be less accountable, it has also been 
pointed out that political competition reduced to two parties decreases the level 
of control over officeholders (Ferejohn, 1986). And while multiparty systems 
facilitate “exit” over “voice”, decentralized parties and single-member con­
stituencies hamper the attribution of political responsibilities and hence 
accountability (Hirschman, 1970; Fiorina, 1981). If we turn to the internal 
affairs of parties, they have been generally considered as irrelevant for 




























































































if political parties are highly competitive, it may not matter a great deal if they are 
not internally democratic or even if they are internally rather oligarchical... If the 
main reason we need political parties at all is in order for them to facilitate 
democracy in the government o f the country, then might not parties that are 
internally oligarchic serve that purpose just as well as, or maybe even better than, 
parties that are internally more or less democratic? (Dahl, 1970: 5).
Oligarchical parties may indeed be more competitive, and party discipline 
may be necessary for electoral victories and stable governments. But party 
members are not just organizational soldiers: they join the party for reasons 
other than the particular interests of their leaders. Parties, as organizations, 
embody an agency relationship between members and leaders, and this rela­
tionship is relevant to citizens in general. In such relationship, the interests of 
militants as principal and those of leaders as agent may not coincide. We may 
assume that the militants have policy preferences and want power in order to 
implement them, but, as their preferences may be distant to those of the 
median voter, they will be willing to make concessions. There is a limit to 
such concessions, though: militants are not recruited among centrist voters. 
People join parties due to ideological motivations; if they want their party to 
be in power, it is in order to implement policies they believe in, not merely 
for the spoils of office. As for the leaders, besides policy preferences, they 
want power both within and without the party, and to maximize their auton­
omy in case their political initiatives do not coincide with those of militants 
(either because they want to attract votes or because their policies, once in 
office, are not popular among militants). So “the mark of a successful political 
party is that it can move to the centre and appeal to voters while simultane­
ously retaining the loyalty and effort of its activists” (Wintrobe, 1993: 254). 
Politicians, as agents, will have to develop strategies towards two principals, 
leading them to believe that their interests (which only partly overlap) are 
being taken care of in the best possible way. Party democracy will depend on 
whether militants have information on leaders’ strategies and policies, can 
monitor their performance, and can reelect or dismiss them accordingly.
But parties are also intermediaries between leaders and citizens. Oligarchi­
cal parties may hamper democracy if they are an obstacle to political account­
ability, if their leaders use them in order to manipulate information and pre­
vent monitoring. Democratic political parties may, on the contrary, be impor­
tant instruments of accountability. If citizens vote a party platform, they will 
expect that the party will control its leaders regarding promises on policies. If, 




























































































connection between citizens and the governmental process, they must follow 
voters’ preferences and control the government, both if they are in power or 
in opposition. Parties provide citizens with informational short-cuts based on 
historical images, all the more relevant when other information is limited or 
missing (Popkin, 1993); such short-cuts may or may not be misleading about 
governmental performance. Leaders may try to protect themselves behind 
such historical party images, the resilient partisan identity of voters, or the 
internal solidarity of party members (“partisan patriotism”). But parties have 
interests that do not necessarily overlap with those of their leaders. They have 
a longer-term horizon, an “inter-temporal brand-name”, and, as Moe puts it, 
they “expect to play the political game again and again, into the distant future” 
(Moe, 1990: 241, fn. 22). So, in difficult times, parties may opt for a 
“scapegoat strategy”: i.e., to change a leader who has become a liability, even 
if the responsibility for unpopular policies is more collective. Thus, the rela­
tionship between parties and leaders is relevant for democratic accountability 
and, in principle, both should not be seen as mirror images of each other. 
Parties are not monolythical actors, but arenas of political struggle. It is the 
combination of such internal struggles and external competition which shapes 
their organizational structures, the way decisions are made, the mechanisms of 
control over the politicians that the parties endorse.
When party members, as principal, cannot monitor the activities of their 
leaders and the party itself becomes an instrument for the manipulation of 
information, the capacity of citizens to control politicians will suffer. Yet bom 
as vehicles for popular participation, defined as such by many constitutions, 
parties have become machineries dominated by oligarchies with their own 
goals. That is, they have increasingly turned into organizational weapons: 
instruments for competition and power, rather than part of the mechanisms 
for the democratic accountability of politicians. To use Michels’ words, “in a 
party... democracy is not for home consumption, but is rather an article made 
for export” (Michels, 1962: 79). Most of Western Europe, where parties have 
a long tradition and dominate politics, shows a combination of what Manin has 
called la démocratie du public and la démocratie de partis (Manin, 1995): that 
is, parties compete at election time with images, symbols, and personalities, 
rather than specific policy positions, while in their internal life the power of 
oligarchies is overwhelming. This bureaucracy is reinforced when a system of 
public financing of parties diminishes the incentives to expand the number of 
militants and promote their rights (Pradera, 1995). Members of such parties 
usually have in fact more rights as citizens than as militants; and, lacking 




























































































(Hirschman, 1970). Sometimes, in joint stock companies shareholders have 
more rights and administrators more responsibilities. If internal democracy is 
limited, electoral systems of proportional representation with closed and 
blocked lists of candidates will transfer decisions from the citizens to the party 
bureaucrats: citizens will vote for a party, militants will have little say on 
candidates, and bureaucrats will choose the future members of Parliament. 
Thus, parliamentary representatives will lose their freedom: they will no 
longer be accountable to their constituencies, but to the party oligarchy. But I 
do not intend to discuss in this paper the impact that different formulas of 
party organization have on the democratic accountability of politicians. Inter­
nal policentricism or factionalism may not lead to greater accountability than a 
centralized leadership, as the examples of the French PS and the Italian PSI 
show. Collusion between plural oligarchies is possible in such organizations. 
Also, while undisciplined and divided parties make the control of politicians 
difficult, if only because they blur the attribution of political responsibilities, 
and are also usually punished by voters, parties that are not regarded as inter­
nally democratic can be electorally successful, as the case of the British Con­
servative party shows. This complex relationship between party organization, 
democratic accountability, and electoral performance needs much more care­
ful analysis. What I intend to show here are the strategies followed by politi­
cians and the role that the party played as intermediation between politicians 
and citizens in one particular setting: that of a party with an absolute majority 
in Parliament and a highly centralized leadership. Such conditions are sup­
posed to facilitate the attribution of responsibility, and hence accountability. 
This was the Spanish experience for more than a decade.
*  *  *
Let us start with the strategies directed by politicians towards their own 
party. To keep control of the party in difficult circumstances is crucial for 
them: incumbents will try to get protection for their unpopular policies or 
breaches of promises under the party’s mantle, that is, quelling internal 
opposition and manipulating party loyalties rooted in past political experi­




























































































with limited information, a sympathetic voter will think that if the party backs 
the politician it will be due to good reasons. And if things turn out bad exter­
nally, the politicians who control their party will at least be able to survive 
internally and have a chance in the future to stand again for office. If they fail 
to control it, they will face political death.
If we turn to examine the Spanish example, for the politicians who had 
taken hold of the leadership of the PSOE as from 1974, party unity and dis­
cipline were the central organizational concern. This was due to several rea­
sons: memories of past fratricidal struggles, the attribution of the defeats in 
the 1977 and 1979 elections to factional disputes, the breakdown of the UCD 
government and party due to internecine confrontations. They believed, there­
fore, that electoral success and governmental stability required strict party 
discipline. As a result, from the end of the 1970s onwards the Socialist party 
was a small but tightly-knit organization. Its membership, which had stood at 
101,000 in 1979, amounted only to 112,000 in 1982, when it won the general 
elections for the first time7. The ratio between members and voters was one of 
the lowest of all Western European socialist parties, close only to the French 
P.S.: it was of 1/54 in 1979, of 1/90 in 1982. The leaders’ control over the 
party was achieved through three main instruments: the very large powers of 
the Federal Executive Committee, the system of majoritarian representation in 
internal party elections, and the Spanish electoral system of proportional rep­
resentation with closed and blocked lists of candidates.
The Federal Executive Committee decided on global party strategy and had 
a decisive influence on the final say over lists of candidates to the Spanish Par­
liament, to regional assemblies, and to local councils in large towns. While 
Felipe Gonzalez provided the ideas and strategy, the deputy leader, Alfonso 
Guerra, controlled the organization: they had both accumulated vast personal 
loyalties ever since the party was reconstructed in the final years of Franco’s 
dictatorship, but the leadership also had powerful instruments for the control 
of the organization. Thus, internal party elections were regulated by a majori­
tarian principle: delegates to congresses were elected in accordance with the 
rule that “winner takes all”. And bloc voting procedures were established so 
that large territorial delegations would have a unitary vote attributed to the 
head of the delegation. Although there were some exceptions to these rules8,
7 Figures from the Secretary of Organization, Federal Executive Committee, PSOE.
8 Such exceptions were that political resolutions were voted by individual delegates, that a 




























































































the oligarchical trends were very strong and the possibility of protest votes 
very limited. The percentage of congress delegates who held public office 
either by election or by appointment went up in the 1980s: it represented 57% 
in 1981, 61% in 1984, 67% in 1990. And the leadership turned more and 
more rigid: while in the 1979 congress, only 42% of the Executive Committee 
was re-elected, the proportion went up to 76% in 1981 and 1984, to 81% in 
1988, and in 1990 only one member who did not want to stand again was 
replaced9. Ever since 1979, the congresses of the PSOE produced majorities 
of over 80% of votes on policies. The PR system with closed and blocked lists 
for Parliament also attributed large powers to the party oligarchy: deputies 
knew that their survival as future candidates depended on the sympathies that 
they could muster within it, to the cost of their representative function and of 
the mediatory role between citizens and the governmental process that parties 
are supposed to fulfil.
Such mechanisms of power probably contributed to the strong competitive­
ness of the party over the 1980s. But within the party, they led to an uncritical 
delegation of decisions to the leadership, the languishing of internal debates, 
the inhibition of information. This could be useful in the short-term (i.e. cor­
respond to the interest of the present leaders), but costly in the long-term 
horizon. The connections with society, the capacity to provide warning lights, 
the anticipation of demands of accountability for broken pledges all suffered. 
Concern over these costs was expressed in an internal document written to 
Gonzalez,
The party has been changing very much. The density of the power relations cannot 
be compared to that existing at any other time. Endogamy, clientelism, “praetorian 
guards” have been reinforced. The ideological and political poverty is today very 
great People think that, as deputies, all kinds of precautions are necessary in order 
not to be a victim of sectarianism. If this were true, if one should be more 
concerned with the apparatus than with voters, then the consequences of the internal 
politics of the party would be of a very serious nature indeed. The party needs 
reflection: serious, wide, and audacious. Not because this will shed light 
miraculously on anything, but because it will allow us to foresee problems, to act
gates, that "currents of opinion" (but not "organized tendencies") were accepted from 
1983 onwards.




























































































and to react... The question is that many sectors of the party can be described as 
follows: too many mafias, too little principles '0.
Such organizational weapon was very successfully used by the government 
in difficult situations. The connection between party and public opinion was 
well perceived by the leaders: while Guerra used to say that “when we con­
vince the party, then we shall be able to convince society” (on the issue of 
NATO), Gonzalez argued that “society will help us to convince the party” (on 
the moderation of socioeconomic policies). To ensure the support of the 
organization, leaders appealed to “partisan patriotism”, used past symbols and 
memories, and when internal criticism was voiced they argued that “the dirty 
linen should not be washed up in public”, that once an issue had been debated 
and decided upon militants should obey it, that party membership was volun­
tary (and thus, that “loyalty” and “exit” were the only options). In October 
1986, Gonzilez himself warned against “serious indications of oligarchization 
and intolerance within the PSOE”, and in February 1990 he denounced that 
“there is fear within the party”11. Yet the party remained mostly an instru­
ment for power. On some delicate policies (such as the reversal over NATO 
or economic policies) and over a prolonged period of time, this instrumental, 
and disciplined party provided a crucial help for the government in rallying 
acceptance from citizens. But its growing internal rigidity, its incapacity for 
circulating information and monitoring its leaders, its lack of internal criti­
cism, and the opacity of its internal politics became eventually very damaging, 
both for the government and for the long-term interests of the party. Thus it 
played an impotent role in the string of scandals that emerged in the 1990s.
The internal evolution of parties became a growing public concern over the 
1990s, while their discredit in public opinion rose. Partisan disaffection 
became an important issue in Western European politics in the decade, 
although this disaffection was often unrelated to the internal democracy of the 
organizations. As a result, different formulas to change their internal life and 
increase their attraction were discussed- none highly imaginative nor success­
ful. In Spain, the constitution of 1978 declared parties to be “a fundamental 
instrument for political participation” and required that “their internal struc-
111 Document written by the author to Felipe Gonzdlez, July 8, 1987. This document and 
those mentioned in notes 18, 24 and 31 were part of a series written between December 
1979 and September 1990, as a member of the Federal Executive Committee (1979-84, 
and 1988-94) and of the Cabinet (1982-88).
11 Speech by Felipe Gonzdlez to the "Autumn School" of the PSOE, Madrid, October 1986, 





























































































ture and operation must be democratic” (article 6). Thus, when the PSOE 
promised a “new democratic impulse” in the elections of 1993, this included a 
law promoting such internal democracy within parties, protecting the rights of 
militants, and reforming party finances and electoral lists. Some of the party 
leaders had come to accept that internal party politics could hamper not the 
information of citizens on politicians, but the information of politicians on 
citizens and on themselves- that is, their rational anticipation of accountability. 
Following these elections, the PSOE formed a minority government with the 
support of the Catalan nationalists: the law was drafted but it was never passed, 
either because of incapacity or unwillingness. It is indeed difficult to imagine 
why politicians would want to transform parties from instruments of power 
into potential arenas for democratic accountability.
*  *  *
Let us now examine more closely politicians’ strategies in critical conjunc­
tures. These will be addressed to the two principals, the party militants and the 
voters, and will try to manipulate information and monitoring, both internally 
in the organization and externally among citizens. Rather than allowing bottom 
to top internal monitoring within the party, which would be facilitated by 
competition for the leadership, incumbents will try to transform the party into 
an instrument for the external manipulation of citizens. They will also use 
political explanations strategically in order to structure public opinion and 
shore up political support for the politicians who provide the account and for 
the unpopular policies12.
1. A first strategy consists of concealing policies; that is, avoiding a critical 
dimension of politics from emerging in the public realm. The strategies will 
try to extend total opacity over such policies, which might have to do with 
actions or non-actions. Non-actions by governments refer to the exclusion of 
potential issues from the political agenda, knowing that public opinion would
12 The impact of such explanations will, of course, depend on the verosimilitude of the ac­
counts, the politicians who provide them, and the different predispositions of voters. See 




























































































force them to take unwanted decisions. Pollution or poverty are well-known 
examples of issues that were in the limbo of politics over a long time 
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1970; Crenson, 1971; Lukes, 1974; Gaventa, 1980). 
When a latent issue enters the public domain, it is normally as the result of 
political struggles, in which segments of the population, extramural actors, and 
different agencies of political pluralism confront governments. These con­
frontations illuminate previously unknown facts, extend information, augment 
public sensitivity over the issue, and eventually help voters in assessing the 
performance of governments. Actions, on the contrary, refer to underground 
initiatives, hidden faces of power, whose public knowledge governments will 
try to avoid. Examples are numerous: they often refer to affairs of security 
and defence, usually protected under the label of “reasons of state”. But they 
extend to many other issues: three recent examples are the bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy in Great Britain, the public provision of AIDS-contaminated 
blood supplies in France and Japan, the Iran-Contra affair in the U.S.13.
The illegal financing of parties (and the associated political corruption) may 
be considered as another illustration of underground political activity. Hidden 
over a long time, the use of under-the-counter commissions, false receipts, and 
a wide panoply of predatory instruments related to executive power as a 
method of financing the parties (and as a source of personal enrichment) has 
turned into a major issue in many democracies. Its political impact has re­
cently been dramatic in Japan, South Korea, or Southern Europe. In Italy, 
over several decades party bureaucracies were transformed into asiatic 
satrapies, in nomenklaturas which used every public resource as private prop­
erty (Flores D’Arcais, 1990). In France, Greece, and Spain, the presence of 
the Socialist parties in government after a long exclusion from power, present­
ing themselves as holders of moral banners, made revelations about their 
involvement in illegal finances particularly scandalous.
Let us look a bit more closely at the Spanish case as an example which has 
many similarities with other experiences. The illegal financing of parties 
emerged publicly as an issue in January 1990, with a scandal over the enrich­
ment of the brother of the vicepresident of the government, Alfonso Guerra, 
which gradually revealed a complex network for the illegal financing of the 
Socialist party and was followed by a string of successive scandals over the
13 Wintrobe defines as a typical “Iran-Contra” strategy one where politicians first break the 
law, then lie to the public, and finally, if discovered, blame the whole affair on the unau­




























































































following five years14. From the initial scandal onwards, the issue was 
brought into the open by the press, and then by the judiciary15. The opposition 
only followed when the issue was already in the agenda, and it stayed silent 
about its similar underground economic activities16. Parliament only debated, 
more or less heatedly, what was already being discussed outside it. This lim­
ited role of the opposition and Parliament was due, on the one hand, to the 
existence of a monolithic party with a parliamentary majority that blocked any 
investigation; on the other, to interpartisan complicity. As the leading political 
analyst of El Pais wrote, “denunciations for illegal financing affect the great 
majority of political parties... The normal operation of representative institu­
tions is paralyzed or obstructed when all (or nearly all) parties collude in a 
strategy of concealment or silence” (Pradera, 1993). The result was that the 
provision of information for political accountability was mostly due to the 
press and the judges.
What did the accused politicians do? Their strategies were directed towards 
the party and towards public opinion. And the first reaction was the use of 
“denials” (McGraw, Best, and Timpone, 1995): that is, the negation that any 
offence had been committed. To put it in other words, the agent first reacted 
denying to the suspicious principal that he had been involved in illegal activi­
ties for his own profit using agency privileges. Defensive strategies directed 
towards the party tried to quell internal protest and suppress demands for 
internal accountability stemming from potential competitors for organizational 
power. In fact, the underground economy of the party had been a secret affair, 
used to finance not just elections but the control over the organization. It was 
based on the opacity of internal party politics, sectarianism, and informal 
nuclei of power. As none of the elected bodies knew about such economic 
activities, denials were first addressed to them, then to the party as a whole, 
finally to socialist voters.
14 These scandals involved the underground activities of Juan Guerra, brother of the deputy 
leader of the party and vicepresident of the government; Filesa, a company set up by sev­
eral members of the party close to the Secretary of Administration; Luis Rolddn, Director 
General of the Civil Guard; Gabriel Urralburu, President of the regional government of 
Navarra and Secretary General of the party in the region.
15 There is a good study which compares the evolutions of the Juan Guerra affair and other 
scandals under different regimes, and which shows the very different role played by the 
press: see Fernando Jimdnez, 1995.
16 These activities were revealed in three affairs of illegal finances: they involved the Mayor 
of Burgos; Rosendo Naseiro, the national treasurer of the Popular party; Gabriel Cafiel- 




























































































So, evidence was declared to be false, and the sources of information were 
discredited. The fact that many media had been involved in virulent antisocial­
ist campaigns helped this strategy for some time. Conspiracies, which did in 
fact exist17, and external enemies were denounced; a rhetoric of “them against 
us” was systematically used to rally support. “Us” involved stressing identity, a 
history of past struggles, loyalty, and “partisan patriotism”. “Them” were a 
threatening and dark coalition of adversaries: powerful sectors of the press, 
the judiciary, big business, banks. The politicians involved exhibited, to use 
Michels’ words, “a notable fondness for arguments drawn from the military 
sphere. They demand, for instance, that, if only for tactical reasons, and in 
order to maintain a necessary cohesion in face of the enemy, the members of 
the party must never refuse to repose perfect confidence in the leaders they 
have freely chosen for themselves” (Michels, 1962: 218).
The party, which had been unable to exert monitoring (i.e. to detect what 
was going on), was now unable to play any role as mediator between citizens 
and politics. It was, most of the time, an internally manipulated instrument that 
served to manipulate citizens; that is, an obstacle to democratic accountability. 
Only gradually, as the scandal continued, internal tensions increased. But dis­
sident voices were accused of complicity with the enemy, of being “victims of 
the Stockholm syndrome”18. That is, the reaction tried to prevent “voice” and 
restrict internal options to “exit” or “loyalty”. After a bitter discussion in the 
Federal Executive Committee, in which once again informers were discredited 
and information on the scandal denied, a report written to Gonzalez denounced 
“the sectarian tendencies and paranoid outbursts referring to alleged internal 
enemies... They see enemies everywhere, generate vague and infamous suspi­
cions on supposed accomplices”19. The internecine struggle went on for four 
years: the result was that, although Guerra and his followers were able to win 
the 1990 congress of the party, their power slowly declined. Thus, Guerra was 
sacked as vicepresident in March 1991 and, although he survived as deputy 
leader in the 1994 congress, his position became minoritarian. This internal
17 The conspiracies were organized with great skill and vast resources. They were mostly 
financed by a banker, Mario Conde, imprisoned after the Bank of Spain discovered a 
major fraud, and spearheaded by a newspaper, El Mundo, and its editor, Pedro J. 
Ramirez. Such conspiracies tried to force the government to drop charges against Conde. 
They found the co-operation of some strongly anti-socialist magistrates and public prose­
cutors. The goal, eventually, was to bring down the government. See Ernesto Ekaizer, 
1996.
18 These were accusations formulated by Alfonso Guerra in a meeting of the Federal Execu­
tive Committee held in September 12,1990.




























































































change in the party was mostly due to divergent views of Gonzalez and Guerra 
about the model of party and the strategies of accountability, to the growing 
evidence about what had been going on, to the succession of additional scan­
dals, to the increasing disaffection of public opinion.
Whenever hidden policies emerge in the open as scandals, politics becomes a 
battle for public opinion (Lang and Lang, 1983). In this Spanish example, the 
initial strategy of politicians towards citizens consisted also of the denial of 
information and the discredit of informants. An argument which was repeat­
edly used in the battle for public opinion was that no political responsibilities 
could be accepted until penal responsibilities had been established. Only then 
could the principal expect the agent to resign or dismiss him on fair grounds. 
The contrary would make politicians very vulnerable to defamation, accusa­
tions without proof, and public trials without guarantees. It would thus be easy 
for powerful extraparliamentary actors to throw from office politicians 
backed by the popular vote. This is an argument which may end up, as I 
argued earlier on, opposing democracy to pluralism. The consequence is also 
an extraordinary politicization of justice and a judicialization of politics.
Over time, however, as the accumulation of evidence became overwhelming 
and additional scandals erupted, the strategy gradually shifted to “excuses” 
(McGraw, Best, and Timpone, 1995): that is, to the rejection of full or partial 
responsibility. The problem was presented as one of isolated individual cor­
ruption, rather than of illegal partisan activities: a “scapegoat strategy”. 
Although the number of “scapegoats” actually became quite long, the leader­
ship never accepted any institutional wrongdoing, although it was also unable 
to tell a convincing story of what had actually happened. And finally, the strat­
egy tried to minimize electoral punishment by emphasizing the resulting costs 
to the voters themselves. The opposition, as the alternative agent, was accused 
of being involved in similar practices. If the choice on this matter was between 
Scylla and Charybdis, then the principal ought to look at other dimensions of 
politics, such as leadership, policies, traditional partisan identities, and so on.
The electoral defeats of incumbents in Greece in 1989 and France in 1993 
were largely the product of popular rejection of similar scandals. In Spain, 
however, the government was able to survive a general election in 1993, 
largely due to the remaining popularity of Gonzalez, his promise to 
“regenerate” the party and politics, sympathy with some governmental poli­
cies, and mistrust towards the opposition. But the impact of the economic 




























































































lot/considerable corruption existed in Spanish politics; 56% believed that it 
was present in every party, while 34% thought that its incidence was greater in 
some of them. Of the latter, 71% considered that it was particularly concen­
trated in the Socialist party. Another survey also carried out in 1993 revealed, 
however, that 64% viewed the opposition in bad terms. But the string of scan­
dals continued. In 1995, corruption was the main political concern for 36% of 
Spaniards, preceded only by unemployment and terrorism20. The consequence 
was that the government could not survive the following election, held in 
1996. But, as had been the case in Greece, the defeat was limited: the Socialists 
managed to maintain 37.5% of the vote, against 38.8% won by the Popular 
party.
*  *  *
2. Let us now turn to what politicians do when they try to transform 
unpopular policies into palatable ones, thus avoiding sanctions from citizens. I 
will assume that governments have mandates which are not controversial: i.e. 
that they are not tied by a thin electoral victory, that they dispose of sufficient 
executive and legislative power. As agents, politicians will try to have unpopu­
lar policies that do not correspond to electoral undertakings assessed according 
to “rules of exception” rather than to “rules of transgression” (Schedler, no 
date). That is, they will argue that the former are due to unforeseen conditions 
that justify the violation of promises, and will reject that they fooled voters ex 
ante with inconsistent, unrealistic, or deceptive pledges21. The new position 
may also be presented as a display of “statesmanship”. As Salmon has noted, 
“the hallmark of statesmanship often consists in a leader bypassing his or her 
party... supporting or implementing policies that are disliked both by it and by 
public opinion” (Salmon, 1993). And the strategies deployed to persuade the
20 The figures are from surveys of DATA, S.A., in May-June 1993 (for the Spanish team 
of the Comparative National Election Project, led by José Ramôn Montera and Richard 
Gunther), and the Centro de Investigaciones Sociolôgicas, December 1993 and April 
1995.
21 “Rules of exception” refer to changed circumstances, new information, modification in 





























































































principal, citizens, will be either prospective or retrospective. In the first case, 
the incumbent will wish to obtain the support of the principal before embark­
ing on a policy course so far unpopular. That is, it will try to influence public 
opinion in order to appear as responsive when undertaking initiatives that 
carry political risks. In the second case, the incumbent will not try to influence 
the policy preferences of citizens, but to survive the costs of unpopular poli­
cies at election time through justifications and compensations. That is, the pol­
icy initiatives will not depend on the support that these find among citizens, 
but the government will try to minimize electoral costs.
There is substantial empirical evidence on the governments’ capacity to 
mould public opinion, in spite of political competitors and media interested in 
the contrary and which provide alternative information to citizens. Page and 
Shapiro, for instance, have shown that 25% of 357 significant changes in pol­
icy preferences in the U.S. between 1935 and 1979 were due to such influence 
of the government; they have also examined more closely the official rhetoric, 
and the use of lies and deception, in several cases having mostly to do with 
foreign policy (Page and Shapiro, 1983 and 1992). In fact, this area of policy 
seems to provide a large number of cases of prospective manipulation. And 
referenda are a typical instrument used by governments to obtain public 
backing before undertaking either a risky initiative or a U-turn in promised 
policy courses. European integration provides examples such as those of Great 
Britain in 1974, Denmark and France in 1992 and 1993. I will examine here 
the Spanish referendum over NATO membership, held in 1986, as an illustra­
tion of the agent’s capacity to influence the principal’s view of what the latter’s 
best interests are.
Spain had joined NATO in May 1982, a decision taken by a conservative 
government widely expected to be trashed in elections due only a few months 
later. The decision was backed by Parliament, with the opposition of the 
Socialist and Communist parties. This opposition reflected a wide hostility 
towards NATO in Spanish society, largely due to a long history of interna­
tional isolation, a military agreement between the U.S. and Spanish govern­
ments under Francoism, and an unsuccessful negotiation with the European 
Community since the return to democracy. Thus, in October 1981, when Par­
liament debated the decision of the government, only 18% of citizens sup­
ported it, while 52% rejected NATO membership22. The Socialist party 
argued that the admission of Spain would increase international tensions, carry
22 Survey of El Pais, October 1981. There is an interesting book on Spanish politics and 




























































































costs without benefits for the country as it would not provide protection 
against its main security risks nor contribute to membership in the European 
Community, and was of sufficient importance to call a referendum over it. In 
the parliamentary debate Gonzalez committed himself to call a referendum on 
NATO if the socialists were to win the next elections. Such positions were 
confirmed by the congress of the PSOE held in November 1981. But member­
ship had been completed at the time of the elections, in October 1982. In the 
electoral manifesto, the PSOE maintained the commitment of the referendum 
and promised to freeze entry into the integrated military command of NATO 
until citizens had decided on the issue of membership.
When the socialists won the elections the question no longer was whether to 
enter into NATO or not, but of whether to leave it or not. The dilemma was 
substantially different: as Gonzalez put it, “not getting married is less trau­
matic than getting divorced”. The traumas of divorce referred to its effects on 
membership in the European Community and on international tensions over 
the deployment of Pershing II and Cruise missiles. Foreign leverage 
(particularly exercized by Helmut Kohl) used these arguments quite forcefully, 
both in order to maintain Spain in NATO and replace the referendum by a 
general election. But Gonzalez also used uncertainty with skill: while he 
expressed solidarity with West European governments that were facing 
domestic problems over the deployment of the “euromissiles”, he exerted 
strong pressure on these governments to accelerate the admission of Spain as a 
member of the European Community. As a result, the European summits of 
Stuttgart and Fontainebleu, held in June of 1983 and 1984, opened the doors to 
membership.
So the government faced two dilemmas: whether to remain in NATO or to 
leave the Alliance, and whether to call a referendum or to replace it with a 
general election. And it had to respond to the party and to the electorate. The 
order of decisions of the government was as follows: the party had to be con­
vinced first, then the electorate; the policy position had to be made clear first, 
then the decision on the referendum would be taken examining the reaction of 
public opinion. Of course the problem of the government was that, in opposi­
tion, it had made strong promises, that the context had now changed, and that 
it perceived the situation differently. If it were to take Spain out of NATO the 
external costs would be serious; if it were to break its pledges, its electoral 
support and the party’s cohesion would be damaged. But it had two cards to 
play: the first was the progress on admission in the European Community; the 




























































































In the Fall of 1984, negotiations over European Community membership 
were in an advanced stage. While France had raised most of the difficulties 
ever since Spain requested admission in 1977, Mitterrand now declared that 
Spain would be a member of the Community as from January 1, 1986. In a 
parliamentary debate on the State of the Nation at the end of October 1984, 
Gonzalez unveiled the position of the government, which defended the perma­
nence of Spain in NATO. The change of course was defended with three main 
arguments: the first was that the situation itself had changed, and the conse­
quences of exit were very different from those of not entering; the second, 
that external constraints were powerful, as European security arrangements 
had to be stable and a country that wanted to be part of West European insti­
tutions had to share defence policies as well; the third, that the position of the 
government entailed compensations which made the policy package acceptable. 
These compensations included a withdrawal of U.S. troops from the military 
bases which had been established in Spain since 1953, under Franco; indepen­
dence from the integrated military command of NATO; a pledge that no 
nuclear weapons would be stored in Spanish territory. That is, the package 
emphasized the inevitability of the decision, the remaining autonomy on 
defence, the minimization of costs, and the benefits of “Europeanization”. 
Eventually, the position of the government was presented in terms of the gen­
eral, non-partisan interest (the slogan was En interes de Espana). The conser­
vative opposition, however, rejected joining the government on this platform: 
it opposed the restrictions to full membership in NATO, the possibility of 
calling a referendum, and, hoping to put the government in a tight spot, 
declared that it would campaign for abstention.
So the government could not play the second card, and the socialists were 
on their own. Convincing the party was not very difficult: Gonzalez had vast 
and solid loyalties and the control of the leadership was very strong. A 
congress held in December 1984 backed the government: while 76% of the 
former Federal Executive Committee were reelected, Gonz&lez won 71% of 
the votes for his new policy on NATO and over 80% for every other issue 
discussed. Thus the organizational weapon was ready to be used to rally vot­
ers. These, however, were less easy to convince. After the policy U-tum of the 
PSOE, in October 1984, the distribution of views on NATO among citizens 
did not vary: 52% were against membership, only 19% were in favour of 
remaining in the alliance23.




























































































The consequence was that the second dilemma of whether to call the refer­
endum or replace it by a general election became dramatic. After the change 
in the policy position, influential actors strongly defended abandoning the 
pledge to take it to the popular vote: foreign prime ministers, domestic 
bankers, businessmen, newspaper editors, and politicians argued that simply to 
call a referendum on such an issue would be an irresponsibility, and that a 
defeat that appeared as likely would be a catastrophe. The decision on the ref­
erendum was then postponed for some time. But shortly after Spain joined the 
European Community in June 1985, the government started the last year of its 
mandate. Polls taken in October and November 1985 indicated that two thirds 
of citizens demanded to vote in a referendum on NATO, that 46% of them 
were against membership in the alliance, and that the proportion of supporters 
remained at 19%24 *. It was clear that the referendum could be lost. But popu­
lar exigencies for the government to call it increased, rather than diminish, 
and the government did not know the electoral costs and the general political 
discredit that dropping the pledge on the referendum would entail. Additional 
considerations were also expressed in an internal document written to 
Gonz&lez:
The credibility of democracy is at stake. It is not only a problem of personal 
credibility: it affects the whole political system. About 70% of citizens demand to be 
consulted through a referendum. It is true that the results are uncertain, and this 
uncertainty will remain until the very end. But most important is that citizens are 
ready to listen to reasons, and we must provide them. Our society today is 
particularly sensitive to Europe: it understands that membership entails costs, but is 
ready to accept them. People demand information and leadership. And while they 
may have confidence in you, they demand to be consulted. On this issue, a gap 
between what Parliament might decide and the preferences of society would be very 
damaging for Spanish politics as a whole.2^
Eventually the government decided to be responsive prospectively, rather 
than accountable retrospectively. That is, to call a referendum on March 1986, 
rather than include the issue among the many others on which it would be held 
accountable at the time of the next election, due a few months later. The result 
of the referendum was not binding, but the government assured citizens that it 
would comply with it. That is, it tried to obtain a mandate for a change of
24 The figures are from polls of Sofemasa and the Centro de Investigaciones SocioWgicas 
carried out in October and November 1985.




























































































policy course that was very unpopular. The logic it used was: “you will see in 
the future that what we want to do is best for you, but we need your acquies­
cence first” Probably such initiative can only be undertaken by governments 
and prime ministers still largely untainted from the tenure of office, confident 
that they can mobilize voters into supporting something different from their 
initial preferences.
Such mobilization was not easy. In the last month, support to NATO only 
increased from 21% to 26%, and opposition only declined from 39% to 
36%26. The visible mobilization corresponded overwhelmingly to the anti- 
NATO coalition, while the conservatives were using the occasion to discredit 
the government. And while the pro-socialist press was torn by its traditional 
pacifist stance and the dramatic situation of the government, the right-wing 
press was much more active in attacking the PSOE and Gonzalez than in 
defending NATO membership. Facing a very likely defeat, the socialists 
intensified their campaign over the last two weeks. They insisted very much on 
all the previous arguments: that, due to the changed circumstances, the exter­
nal constraints, and the compensations, the position of the government was the 
best possible option, that the others entailed serious costs, and that 
“Europeanization” was at stake. But they increased the drama with two addi­
tional resources: the resignation of Gonzalez as Prime Minister in case of 
defeat, and the risk of an unpopular opposition throwing the government out. 
The campaign thus became plebiscitarian, facilitated by the conservatives’ 
strategy. The confusion of citizens, as a principal being required by its agent 
to change its policy preference, was considerable: they were uncertain about 
the true nature of the external constraints, the costs of sticking to the initial 
preference, the altruism or opportunism of the opposition. And although the 
h o rro r  vacu i in case of the government being defeated was very extended, the 
uncertainty lasted until the very last moment: the final published survey before 
voting day predicted that the government would get only between 40% and 
46% of the votes, while the “no” vote would reach between 52% and 56%27.
The vote eventually backed the government: 53% supported its position, and 
40% rejected it. A post-referendum survey28 revealed how close it had never­
theless been: 27% had made up their decision in the last three days, and an 
additional 21% in the last two to three weeks. The percentages were similar
26 Surveys of Institute Alef on February 2-4 and February 28 to March 1-3, 1986.
27 Reported by El Pais, March 6, 1986. Similar results were predicted by surveys of 
Emopublica, Sigma Dos, Aresco, Tdcnicas de Comunicaci6n.




























































































for the electorate as a whole and for voters of the PSOE in the earlier general 
election of 1982. Only 12% declared that they had voted “yes” because they 
had always believed that Spain should join NATO. The reasons of the govern­
ment had a clear influence on voters: 44% had been convinced that its position 
represented best the general interest (against 30% who had not); more particu­
larly, 27% of those who voted “yes” argued that they had done so because 
Spain had to share the responsibility of European defence, and 17% because of 
the restrictive conditions on NATO membership that the government had 
established. Former PSOE voters provided more frequently reasons of loyalty: 
in 41% of the cases they had voted “yes” because that meant supporting their 
party or the government. Their support was crucial for the final result: they 
provided 67% of the “yes” vote; in contrast, former voters of the Popular 
party, the centrists and the Communist party represented only 7%, 5%, and 
1% respectively of such vote. The government had won by mobilizing its 
previous electorate.
A few months later, in June 1986, the PSOE won again the general elec­
tions, with 44% of the vote and an absolute majority of the seats. This percent­
age was four points below its 1982 result. According to a post-electoral sur­
vey29, of those previous socialist supporters who switched their vote to 
another party or to abstention, only 28% had voted “yes” in the NATO refer­
endum: the rest had mostly voted “no” (47%), abstained, or provided a blank 
vote (16%). So the policy change had a cost for the government, albeit limited. 
And to honour the pledge of calling a referendum had carried serious risks 
indeed. The government was able to survive them with a strategy that empha­
sized changes in circumstances, external constraints, compensations, and the 
costs that punishing the incumbents would carry for the voters. So the agent 
adapted the principal to the former’s policy preference, and could claim to be 
prospectively responsive.
*  *  *




























































































3. The strategies of a government as agent vis-a-vis its citizens as principal are 
much more often addressed to the latter’s retrospective evaluation at election 
time than to its prospective support to embark on a risky policy course. 
Referenda are exceptional initiatives; strategies for surviving unpopular poli­
cies, betrayed promises, and political U-turns at election time are on the con­
trary part of what politics is normally about. I will not discuss why politicians 
follow such paths: they may have made opportunist electoral promises that 
they never intended to fulfil; they may have had access to new information; the 
“objective conditions” may have unexpectedly changed; the constraints may be 
overwhelming. Governments, for whatever reason, might think that popular 
but inefficient policies will eventually generate more political costs than 
unpopular but efficient ones. Eventually, citizens’ preferences will be tempo­
rally inconsistent; if the government is responsive, its electoral support will 
suffer when the time of being held accountable comes. Over the last 15 years 
many governments have undertaken economic policies that combined in dif­
ferent ways betrayal of electoral promises, unpopularity, and also poor per­
formance. Yet their political consequences have not been inevitably disastrous. 
The principal appears to have considered that performance was not 
attributable to the agent, that the latter was doing as best he could, that alter­
native courses of action or another agent would lead to worse material out­
comes. How can the agent influence such benevolent considerations?
I shall examine as illustration the Spanish experience of economic policies 
between 1982 and 1996. The Socialist government had not made promises 
comparable to those of the PS in France or the PASOK in Greece before their 
electoral victories of 1981. It did not commit itself to vast nationalizations, 
state- and demand-led growth, irreversible steps towards socialism, nor to 
changer la vie. But it promised growth and the creation of 800,000 jobs over 
four years. Its record over economic growth was rather satisfactory: over that 
period, the average annual rate was of 2.4%, an improvement over the rate of 
0.6% in the previous four years, and equivalent to that of the European Com­
munity as a whole. On the contrary, its performance over jobs was dramatic: 
the unemployment rate went up 3.7 percentage points, reaching 21.2% of the 
active population30. Cheibub and Przeworski have shown that unemployment 
is the only outcome that appears to affect the political survival of heads of 
government in parliamentary democracies (Cheibub and Przeworski, 1996). 
Yet after his initial electoral victory of 1982, Gonzalez was able to win three 
consecutive elections in 1986, 1989, and 1993.
30 The figures on economic performance over time are from Economie Européenne (1995: 




























































































The paradox not only lies in the “objective condition” of high unemploy­
ment, but on the “subjective condition” of a deep unpopularity of the govern­
ment’s economic policies. We may divide the Spanish experience in four main 
phases: a first one of harsh economic adjustment and tough economic condi­
tions (1982-1985); a second one of rapid growth and intense job creation 
(1986-1991); a third one of sharp economic deterioration and growing unem­
ployment (1992-1994); a fourth one of renewed economic growth and lower 
unemployment (1995 and 1996). No clear connection existed between such 
“objective conditions”, “subjective conditions” (i.e. the popular evaluation of 
the economic situation and of economic policies), and political support to the 
government. Pessimism over the economy and hostility towards economic 
policies were always considerable, but much less so in the first period of hard­
ship, when voters were clearly prospective and their views on the economy 
were influenced by their hopes in the new government. At the end of this first 
period, in June 1986, the PSOE won its second election, with 21.2% of the 
population unemployed. In the following phase of prosperity, economic poli­
cies became much more unpopular. When new elections were called in Octo­
ber 1989, the annual rate of growth had stood on average at 5.2%, while 
unemployment had fallen by four percentage points. Support for the govern­
ment fell by five percentage points of the overall vote, although it managed to 
win for the third time. In the following phase of economic crisis, growth fell 
to 1.4% on annual average and unemployment went up again to 22.8% of the 
active population. This time such deterioration was reflected in a massive pes­
simism about economic conditions and an intense hostility towards economic 
policies. Yet the government managed to win again for a fourth time, in June 
1993. Then, after two years of strong economic recovery, the PSOE was 
thrown out of power in March 1996.
Economic policies were disliked both by the party and the electorate, and 
performance had no clear influence on their views. On the contrary, social 
policies were always more popular and their support, rather than weaken, 
increased over time. Let us consider, for example, popular assessments of the 
evolution of education, health care, and the economy in four points of time. In 
1986, after a long crisis and when an economic recovery was starting, only 
20% of citizens believed that the economy had improved over the last years, 
while the percentages for education and health care were 52% and 46% 
respectively. In 1988, in the middle of a phase of strong growth and job cre­
ation, positive assessments of the economy went up to 31% (still below nega­




























































































ment policies (negative ones reached 46%). The views on education and health 
care hardly varied: the percentages of positive assessments were 52% and 
41%. In 1993, in the middle of a new recession, only 29% of citizens consid­
ered economic policy as “good”, while the percentage for education policy was 
61%. Finally, in 1995, when economic growth had picked up again, only 20% 
of people thought that the economy had improved, but the corresponding per­
centages for education and health care were 68% and 65%31.
Voters tended to support the government if they approved of social policies, 
even if they disliked economic policies, and this was quite independent from 
the economic cycle. The same happened within the party, where the ministers 
of the Economy were always unpopular. Their power was only a delegation of 
Gonzalez’s, who used to recall an advice of Olof Palme that the Prime minister 
ought to back the minister of the Economy in 98% of the occasions (sic). 
Gonzalez also used social policies to defend his economic policy both within 
the party and towards public opinion. His arguments were that there was little 
margin for options in macroeconomic management; that, although economic 
efficiency was a means for social policies, it also was their necessary requisite; 
that the political identity of the government depended, rather than on a distinct 
macroeconomic program, on choices over social policies. That the combina­
tion between social and economic policies was not an easy one is reflected on 
the following quote from a report written to Gonzalez:
In a first moment, a governmental discourse based on technical rationality dazed 
our supporters. To listen to members of a socialist government speaking of liquid 
assets or the stational evolution of M-3 produced astonishment. The government 
not only connected with demands for social reform, but it also seemed to master 
cryptical knowledges. This impact has now vanished. Unemployment, conflict 
over industrial reconversion, failed concertation with unions, strikes, insecurity: all 
this has eroded the faith in our quasi-thaumaturgical virtues. On the contrary, we 
now have an image of 'job destroyers’. True, in the name of a future recovery, but 
we do not explain well why we should have hope in the future. Our policies appear 
considerably distant and displicent regarding the anguish of so many of our 
citizens; we are far from expressing sufficient concern over their conditions. The 
government seems to consider itself the only economically rational agent. To 
declare that there is no alternative macroeconomic policy is a terrible expression of 
pragmatism. If this is so, then we have to establish the differences in a lot of other 
policies. These differences are so far not sufficient enough. We must reinforce our
33 Surveys of Centro de Investigaciones Socioldgicas, May 1986, February 1988, April 




























































































fairer and more humane policies: this is what was expected from us, and this is 
what is still expected.32
Anticipating elections, governments look at opinion polls and organize their 
strategies accordingly. In the Spanish case, the government knew that when 
citizens considered its record in office, they sympathized more with social 
policies. The campaigns gave thus more prominence to this dimension of 
accountability. The strategy thus resembled what Nagel has called “reinforcing 
the winning dimension” -a heresthetical device used by incumbents in order to 
maintain a winning majority (Nagel, 1993). The result was that, when asked in 
post-electoral surveys about their main reason to support the socialists, a large 
proportion answered that its overall policy record: the percentages were 29% 
in 1986, 37% in 1989, 23% in 1993, when popular social policies could suc­
cessfully compensate the more impopular aspects of such record.
The government also knew that, in a démocratie du public, the attraction of 
the leader is important: thus, Gonzalez was a major factor in the campaigns. 
The percentages of socialist voters who declared that Gonzâlez had been their 
main reason for supporting the government were 22% in 1986, 14% in 1989, 
23% in 199333. But perhaps the most crucial influence of leadership was on 
the undecided voters. This was clearly revealed in a panel study of the 1993 
general election: surveys had indicated since January 1992, with few excep­
tions, that the PSOE was behind the conservative Popular party in electoral 
support, and the prediction that the government would be defeated lasted until 
the very last day. Eventually the PSOE won by a difference of four percentage 
points. Its victory was due to a last minute decision of a substantial proportion 
of the electorate: as Barreiro and Sânchez-Cuenca have shown, these voters 
were situated on the left, most of them being former supporters of the party 
unhappy with the policy record of the government, and they eventually rallied 
round Gonzalez, stimulated by a campaign centered on him (Barreiro and 
Sânchez-Cuenca, 1996). Thus, when election time comes and citizens, as prin­
cipal, have to evaluate the performance of the agent under conditions of 
imperfect information, they look for clues. A “good guy” might lead them to 
assume that he did his best under conditions which were not totally under his 
control, and that he pursued the principal’s interest as best he could. This con­
sideration might be reinforced by distrust towards the alternative agent. This
32 Document written by the author to Felipe Gonzdlez, March 22, 1984.





























































































additional strategy of highlighting the costs for the principal of sanctioning the 
agent was systematically pursued by the socialists.
Finally, loyalty to the party and the historical image of the PSOE were an 
important reason given by socialist voters to explain their continuing support. 
If we look at the three elections of 1986, 1989, and 1993, partisan loyalty was 
what moved 14%, 15%, and 14% of the socialist electorate to vote for the 
PSOE; in addition, 20%, 22%, and 24% indicated that the main reason for 
their vote had to do with the traditional identity of the party (in terms of 
democracy or the left). As Popkin argues, “party loyalties are not easily 
changed. They reflect past political battles that have shaped the ways in which 
voters thought about politics and government” (Popkin, 1993: 23). Thus, the 
influence of such informational short-cuts rooted in historical images, together 
with the overall policy record of the government and the personal attraction of 
the party leader, help to explain the capacity of the socialists to survive in 
office.
To sum up, the Spanish government framed its economic performance with 
a strategy that used a panoply of different arguments vis-a-vis the party and 
the electorate to avoid punishment for policies that these two principals 
thought were not in their best interest:
(1) The inevitability of such policies. This was due to the inheritance of 
previous governments (la herencia recibida): the government presented its 
tough economic policies as an antidote to previous mismanagement. If they 
were harsh, that was due to others’ mistakes. They were also determined by 
exogenous constraints. When the government announced its program of eco­
nomic adjustment, Gonzalez argued that the government would do by itself 
what the IMF would force it to do otherwise. Later on, the European Com­
munity was often used by the government as a justification: i.e. as a source of 
overwhelming economic exigencies referring to anti-inflationary policies, fis­
cal discipline, and industrial reconversion. Gonzalez was himself more careful 
in this respect, in order to avoid an anti-European backlash: economic global­
ization took the place of the European Community, his argument being that 
even without the Maastricht requirements economic competitiveness would 
require similar measures. The alternative would be worse: isolation, protec­
tionism, sanctions from the European Community or from the international 
economic community. The consequence might be called the TINA (“there is no 
alternative”) syndrome: economic conditions would be worse if other policies 




























































































Argentinean soccer trainer, called “the shrinking of spaces” (el achique de 
espacios): a reduction of the space for policy options.
(2) The promise of “light at the end of the tunnel”. That is, things will 
improve, but only after crossing a “valley of tears”. This argument is 
intertemporal; the trade-off is the opposite to a popular Spanish saying: rather 
than “bread today, hunger tomorrow” {pan para hoy, y hambre para mahana), 
the promise consists of “hunger today, bread tomorrow”. The government 
made systematic use of such an intertemporal discourse: it used different 
metaphors, such as “entering the European first division” or “not missing the 
train of modernity”, in order to make it worthwhile crossing the tunnel. Other 
policies were presented as a risk, as a delay of the end of the problem, as 
involving worse intertemporal trade-offs because they would lead to a bleaker 
future.
(3) The offer of present compensations. These consisted of social policies, 
but also of popular political initiatives that no alternative government would 
allegedly provide (a reform of abortion is an example). As I have argued, the 
government inserted unpopular policies in more attractive “policy packages”. 
Social policies tried to reduce hardship, avoid distributional opposition, build 
support constituencies. Social and political compensations tried to provide 
clues about the political identity of the government to disoriented voters, acti­
vate associations with historical party images, attract complicity and under­
standing among supporters. Sometimes, parliamentary or extraparliamentary 
confrontations with ideological antagonists over popular policies (such as 
reforms of education or abortion) served to provide additional clues and 
gather support from citizens unhappy about other initiatives of the agent.
(4) The popular leadership in contrast to the mistrusted opposition. The 
alternative agent was used over a very long time as a disincentive for the 
principal to punish the incumbent. When the credit of the opposition is low, 
either because of its past policy record or poor leadership, the autonomy of 
governments increases -i.e. its accountability diminishes because of the com­
mitment problem that the principal faces. The historical image of the party, 
associated with its democratic and leftist past, was used as a powerful symbolic 
instrument to mobilize voters suspicious of the true identity and intentions of 
the opposition.
The success of such arguments in defending unpopular economic policies, 




























































































uation in which the government finds itself. A new government that under­
takes unpopular policies will use more successfully arguments (1) and (2). In 
such case, the strategy will try to influence a pattern of prospective voting. 
Voters will attribute hardship to the past, be pessimistic in retrospect, support 
a government that has taken over after a discredited predecessor even though 
things are bad, and be optimistic prospectively. But the past is rapidly forgot­
ten, honeymoons do not last long, voters have a limited memory of past per­
formance. And when a government that has aged launches unpopular policies, 
it will have to rely more on arguments (3) and (4), which will be handled con­
servatively: i.e. emphasizing the risks of losing progress made over the last 
years, of missing opportunities, of changing an experienced agent. This strat­
egy will try to induce retrospective voting: it will claim credit for achieve­
ments of the past. Voters will be pessimistic, and their support to the govern­
ment depends a lot on resignation and on whether they see the opposition as 
worse.
The passing of time did matter for the strategies of the Spanish government. 
After winning in unexpected fashion in 1993, it followed the same strategy in 
1996. The economy was in fact performing much better. But other issues and 
time had made the government more vulnerable, past achievements less effec­
tive, and Gonzdlez less credible. Among such issues, the emergence of the 
scandals that I discussed earlier on had a decisive influence. And yet, insisting 
on social policies and the leadership of Gonzalez, the socialists managed to 
reduce an initial disadvantage close to 10 points in opinion polls to 1.3 at elec­
tion time. As agents, incumbent politicians can skillfully manage a repertoire 
of strategies for manipulating accountability and do well. And if the principal 
eventually decides to replace them, they will stand by, waiting for the next 
election, the rapid erosion of memory of the principal, and unhappiness of the 
latter regarding its choice of a new agent.




























































































Thus, politicians do not face in passivity the uncertain verdict of citizens. 
They develop typical strategies of survival that are not irrelevant for demo­
cratic accountability. Rather than look at principals (i.e. citizens), I have 
focused on what is it that agents (i.e. incumbent politicians) do, if they are 
interested in staying in power and maximizing their political autonomy, when 
their policies are unpopular. What they do is manipulate to their advantage the 
problems of information, monitoring, and commitment of citizens when 
assessing whether the incumbent is pursuing their interest or not, and whether 
he should be rewarded or not in elections.
Agents operate in complex scenarios, with multiple interests involved in 
political struggles and competing to persuade citizens. While this variety of 
sources of information increases the monitoring capacity of citizens, 
contradictory informations that generate mistrust on their reliability may be 
used by incumbents to their advantage with strategies of discredit. And while 
the incumbent party is an important aspect of democratic accountability as far 
as it involves agency relationships between voters and party, militants and 
leaders, its predominant role in contemporary democracies as an instrument 
for power (winning elections and protecting the government) serves politicians 
to manipulate accountability. A party that is both unitary and transparent, 
democratic and disciplined, is a rare political animal. Most of the time, 
democratic accountability and political success, both in elections and in office, 
are not easily compatible. So, difficult choices have to be made.
Unpopular policies may be kept out of the political domain or be publicly 
known. When a formerly secret policy emerges publicly, incumbents will use 
strategies of concealment of political responsibility and will mobilize “partisan 
patriotism” and discipline to get protection under the party’s mantle. I have 
used the example of illegal party finances to illustrate the margin of manoeu­
vre of politicians to disorient citizens and avoid punishment. In such cases, 
politicians’ collusion may paralyze democratic institutions as mechanisms of 
accountability. When this happens, as it often does, politicians will surrender 
their own control to other institutions (the press, the judiciary), and demo­
cratic accountability will be distorted.
When governments publicly embark, for whatever reasons, on unpopular 
policy courses, they have two options. One is to get the ex ante acceptance of 
citizens, so that after changing their initial policy preferences, governments 
may appear as responsive. Referenda are a typical example, and I have exam­




























































































over NATO backed by citizens. The other option is to win the ex post 
approval of citizens at election time, with retrospective strategies. I have dis­
cussed, as illustrations, the strategies of the Spanish government to survive its 
unpopular economic policies and large unemployment. Both options require 
that the agent persuades the principal that the policy course is not due to the 
former’s responsibility, but to the inheritance of past administrations, to unex­
pected changes in “objective conditions”, or to overwhelming and unantici­
pated external constraints. The principal’s approval also depends on the dis­
credit of alternative options, an acceptable intertemporal trade-off, and addi­
tional policy initiatives that will make the “package” more palatable. In some 
circumstances (for instance, a recently elected government), mistrust towards 
the alternative agent, the historical image of the party, and personal qualities 
of the incumbent (“leadership”, “good guy” image) will be part of the manipu­
lative strategy.
This is not a study on the probabilities of survival that are associated with 
such strategies. But the illustrations from recent Spanish politics show that this 
repertoire of strategical resources can be skillfully used. This may help us to 
understand why incumbents often manage to survive negative “objective con­
ditions”, political U-turns, and unpopularity. Machiavellian virtu is part of the 
explanation: the fate of politicians is not inexorably tied to their performance, 
and to some extent they can manipulate accountability. As a result, govern­
ments may dispose of “relative autonomy” vis-a-vis citizens. What this means 
is that, on the one hand, short-term political opportunism is not a necessary 
condition for survival, and that an agent may work in the long-term interest of 
the principal. But also, on the other hand, that an agent who has shirked, i.e. 
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